

”Rysslands krig mot Ukraina (och..)”

2023-05-29

Övlt Peter Lidén, Försvarshögskolan (Militärvetenskapliga Institutionen), sedan augusti 2019;
Chef Försvarsavdelning Kiev samt Försvarsattaché till Ukraina, Georgien resp Moldavien
augusti 2015 – augusti 2019.

12 bilder, som underlag för efterföljande diskussion:

- Historian
- Kriget
- Viljan
- Försvar..
- Diskussionen

Україна



”Brödrafolken”

- ”RU resiliens” ska inte underskattas – men inte heller överskattas eller felattribueras: Tsarrysslands och Sovjetunionens motståndskraft och återhämtningsförmåga kom mycket från att UA var del av de statsbildningarna. SU:s största förluster och umbäranden i VK2 togs av BY och UA...
- Trots likheter UA-RU finns distinkta skillnader, som kompletterats och förstärkts under nio års krig. Revolutionerna i UA, 2004/2014 (mot valfusk, repression och antidemokratisering och med stort antal dödade) medförde en kultur av att våga opponera sig, även hos andra än de ”mest modiga”...
- RU har utgått från att UA hade: en liten maktelit, en liten direkt antirysk opinion och en befolkningsmajoritet som var antingen likgiltiga eller fogliga. Detta eftersom RU ju fungerar så. Det finns oppositionella, fria tänkare och till och med revolutionärer i RU, också, men (på grund av ”repressionens socialdarwinism”) splittrade i små och marginaliserade grupper. UA har en distinkt frihetlig och demokratisk kultur sedan århundraden, som Tsarryssland och Sovjetunionen alltså försökt rota ut, men som överlevt och utvecklats. UA är på så vis - och ser sig också som - tydligt Europeiska.
- Två viktiga steg under krigets första åtta år, som är betydelsefulla i detta avseende, är:
 - Decentraliseringen – där faktisk makt och förtroende delegerades ut från ”centralmakten” och där SE och DE (inom ramen för EU) var stora stödjare – respektive..
 - Polisreformen – där en fruktad, tidigare korrupt och maktfullkomlig kontaktyta mellan staten och medborgarna byttes ut mot en omvitnat välfungerande ordningsmakt. RU polis – och än mer så deras ockupationsstyre – har systematiskt tillämpat precis samma gamla repressionsbeteende: ”kör igenom så många invånare som möjligt i regelbundet återkommande och brutala förhör, för att passivisera”.

Under Sovjettiden betonades detta och vid 300-årsjubiléet överlämnades Krim till Ukrainas sovjetrepubliken, på grund av ”geografisk, ekonomisk och kulturell närhet till Ukraina”. Rasism var kanske aldrig del av den rysk-sovjetisk-ryska hållningen mot Ukraina, men utplånande av Ukrainas nationella identitet var *alltid* en del av den.

Nutidshistorien och "den eviga freden"

Ukraina samtyckte till att destruera/överlämna sin kärvapenarsenal (världens då tredje största) och -bärare i Budapest-memorandumet, som signerades av Ukraina, USA, Storbritannien och Ryssland, den 05 december 1994.



Presidents Clinton, Yeltsin and Kravchuk join hands in the Kremlin after signing the nuclear disarmament agreement. Under the agreement Ukraine, the world's third largest nuclear power, said it would turn all of its strategic nuclear arms over to Russia for destruction. (Photo by SERGEY SUPINSKI / AFP)

Genom att signera Budapest-memorandumet återförsäkrade USA, Storbritannien och Ryssland (de övriga kärnvapenmakterna Frankrike/Kina gav motsvarande löften, men i vagare form, i separata dokument) att de skulle respektera Ukrainas oberoende, suveränitet och territoriella integritet, inom då gällande gränser – samt att de skulle avstå från våld eller hot om våld mot Ukraina.





Nutidshistorien och "narrativet": Offerkofta/Bunkermentalitet

"Förtryck av
språkliga
minoriteter"

Tills för ett par år sedan
av bl a UK myndigheter
även betraktat som en
"extremistisk" symbol...



"Revisionism" och
"Rehab/hyllning av
fascist-ikoner"

"Politisering av
konfession" och
"urholkning av
etik/moral",
"närmande till
katolicism"





“Creeping” annexation at sea



UKR gas platform illegal exploitation by RF


2015	2016	2017

Consequences

**Losses - \$ 19 billions
 (about 4 bln. m³ of gas)**

"Gråzon"...

"Hybridkrigföring"?



Figuren baseras ursprungligen på Försvarsmaktens Militärstrategisk doktrin (2016), senare kompletterad med "Exempel på möjliga medel för påverkan mot Sverige", Gunnar Karlson (C MUST, Sälen 10 januari 2017). Därefter har den vidareutvecklats av FOI.



RUSSIA'S WAR PROPAGANDA

strategic/tactical narratives and their audiences

01

Russian domestic audience

1. "The Ukrainian nation does not exist"
2. "Ukraine was granted existence by Russia"
3. "Sovereign Ukraine is a project of 'anti-Russia'"

- Russia's war against Ukraine is not a war but a 'special military operation'
- "Ukrainians opposing Russian rule are Nazis"
- "NATO uses Ukraine to attack Russia"
- "Ukraine's leaders are Satanists" etc

02

Ukrainian audience

1. "Russians and Ukrainians are brotherly nations"
2. "Ukraine is part of the Russian civilization"
3. "Ukraine can only be successful together with Russia"

- "Ukraine's leadership betrays ordinary Ukrainians"
- "West will fight Russia 'to the last Ukrainian'"
- "Gayropa: The West is degenerate" etc



04

The West

1. "Russia is a global power with a right to its own sphere of influence, and Ukraine belongs there"
2. "Ukraine as part of the West poses an existential threat to Russia"
3. "The West is using NATO to encircle Russia"

- "The West attacks Russia because of 'Russophobia'"
- "Ukraine has an immense Nazi problem"
- "Ukraine is very corrupt, cannot be part of West"
- "Sanctions are very damaging" etc

03

The Global South

1. "Russia is the leader of the global anti-imperialist and anti-colonial front"
2. "The West is using the Ukraine war to reclaim global domination"
3. "Ukraine is part of the Russian legitimate sphere of influence"

- "Western support for Ukraine is driven by anti-Russian racism"
- "Ukraine endangers global food security"
- "Ukraine is developing biological weapons in secret US-funded biolabs" etc

Classification by Anton Shekhovtsov; infographic by Euromaidan Press

Narratives targeting the UA audience are less aggressive towards UA than are those directed to the RU audience. This is because of the different objectives that the Kremlin has in the two nations.


In RU, the Kremlin tries to justify genocidal intentions and occupation plans while, in UA, it aims not only to break the fighting spirit of the UA society but also to pacify the population on the occupied territories.

Russian tactical narratives targeting the Global South are curious in that they are focusing predominantly on the West, rather than UA, because for many in the Global South, especially in Africa, Latin America, and Southern and Western Asia, there is little difference in perceptions of RU and UA. In the Kremlin's messaging for the Global South, UA is bad not because it is presumably "anti-RU", but because of its ties to the often-demonised Western world.

- **"De-Nazification" of Ukraine is an objective of the "SVO".**
- **"Russia never lost wars: 'we will necessarily win'".**
- **"Ukraine commits genocide of ethnic Russians in Donbas and elsewhere in Ukraine".**
- **"Ukraine's territory belongs to Russia: 'we do not occupy Ukrainian lands – we return to Russia what is rightfully ours'".**
- **"Ukraine is run by Nazis or, at least, has an immense Nazi problem"**
- **"Russians and Ukrainians are one people"**
- **"Russia wants peace negotiations but Ukraine and the West are not interested in peace"**
- **"European support for Ukraine will result in geopolitical decline of Europe"**
- **"US uses the Ukraine war to cement its position as the dominant power"**
- **"Western weapons given to Ukraine will end up with criminals/terrorists"**
- **"The West should not oppose Russia because it has nuclear weapons; or is making a 'dirty bomb'"**



THREATS DIRECTIONS AROUND UKRAINE



Operativa/taktiska läget APR/MAJ



Head of State (Pres) Putin
MinDef Shoigu
Army Gen Gerasimov
C of Gen Staff & 1st Dep MinDef

Information as of 07 2300 April 2023 (GMT)

Revised Russian War Aims
End-state: A rump Ukrainian state that is politically and militarily neutral (i.e., dependent on international economic & security guarantees that require Russian consent), conditionally transparent borders to facilitate cultural and economic integration of Ukraine with the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU).

Strategic Goals to achieve End-state :

- 1) Ukrainian recognition of Russian annexation of Crimea and the Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhzhia, & Kherson Oblasts into the Russian Federation.
- 2) Control of a land corridor to through southern Ukraine Crimea and full control of the water supply to the peninsula.
- 3) Degrade the ZSUe capacity & capability to conduct large-scale offensive maneuver (i.e., refreeze line of contact)
- 4) Ukrainian declaration stating rejection of future NATO membership.

INS/Russian War Aims
End-state: A Ukraine that is politically independent and able to secure its internationally recognized borders, in possession of a legally binding security guarantee agreement backed by the U.S. & major European powers, cultural and economic integration of Ukraine with the European Union, Russian war criminals arrested & tried by the International Criminal Court (ICC).

Surmised Strategic Goals to achieve End-state:

- 1) Defeat of Russian Armed Forces & their expulsion from all Ukrainian territory.
- 2) Russian recognition of Ukrainian International Borders.
- 3) U.S. / European security guarantee agreement recognized by Russia.
- 4) Application to European Union accepted by Russian Parliament, not opposed by Russia.
- 5) Arrest of Russian war criminals to be tried by ICC.



Russo-Ukraine

ColGen Surovikin

ColGen Syrskiy

LtGen Navev

Gen Zaluzhnyi

LtGen Shaptala

Com OC South

Operational Group of Russian Forces or Its Equivalents - 2d GFA, 3d GFA, 4th GFA, 5th GFA, 6th GFA, 7th GFA, 8th GFA, 9th GFA, 10th GFA, 11th GFA, 12th GFA, 13th GFA, 14th GFA, 15th GFA, 16th GFA, 17th GFA, 18th GFA, 19th GFA, 20th GFA, 21st GFA, 22nd GFA, 23rd GFA, 24th GFA, 25th GFA, 26th GFA, 27th GFA, 28th GFA, 29th GFA, 30th GFA, 31st GFA, 32nd GFA, 33rd GFA, 34th GFA, 35th GFA, 36th GFA, 37th GFA, 38th GFA, 39th GFA, 40th GFA, 41st GFA, 42nd GFA, 43rd GFA, 44th GFA, 45th GFA, 46th GFA, 47th GFA, 48th GFA, 49th GFA, 50th GFA, 51st GFA, 52nd GFA, 53rd GFA, 54th GFA, 55th GFA, 56th GFA, 57th GFA, 58th GFA, 59th GFA, 60th GFA, 61st GFA, 62nd GFA, 63rd GFA, 64th GFA, 65th GFA, 66th GFA, 67th GFA, 68th GFA, 69th GFA, 70th GFA, 71st GFA, 72nd GFA, 73rd GFA, 74th GFA, 75th GFA, 76th GFA, 77th GFA, 78th GFA, 79th GFA, 80th GFA, 81st GFA, 82nd GFA, 83rd GFA, 84th GFA, 85th GFA, 86th GFA, 87th GFA, 88th GFA, 89th GFA, 90th GFA, 91st GFA, 92nd GFA, 93rd GFA, 94th GFA, 95th GFA, 96th GFA, 97th GFA, 98th GFA, 99th GFA, 100th GFA


4 - Present:
(TVD) 20 Feb- 2023
Created by @Jom

Events: 20 Feb-07 Apr 23:


- 21 FEB - Heavy fighting reported in Yahidne and Berkhinka north of Bakhmut
- 28 FEB - PSU conducts Large-scale UCAV strikes in Russia
- 09 MAR - VKS conducts Country-wide air strikes of Ukrainian C2 & critical infrastructure
- 19 MAR - ZSU forces advance south of Orikhiv
- 25 MAR - Wagner Group & VDV advance in Bakhmut area
- 29 MAR - Ukrainian National Guard repels 2d AC attacks in Bilohorivka
- 05 APR - Wagner Group is reported to have taken downtown Bakhmut

Symbology Guide


◆ Russian unit	■ Administered	→ Force of Interest
◆ Belarusian unit	■ Russian Occupied	→ Off Active
◆ Ukrainian Ground unit	◆ Russian Supported Separatists	◆ Force Defeat
◆ Ukrainian Aviation unit	◆ Pocket of Resistance	◆ Air Miss
	◆ Ukrainian Partisan Activity	◆ No Part



25° 30° 35°



Jay in Kyiv @JayinKyiv · 13 h
In a day, the Free Russia Legion has taken control of more territory in Belgorod than Russian forces were able to seize in Bakhmut over 6 months.



50°

50°

45°

45°

25°

30°

35°

40°


"Opinionskonsensus" – men också "tryck"

("31 MAR 2024"? (UA presidentval, "i vanliga fall"))

In your opinion, should Ukraine continue to fight...

1 YEAR OF WAR
Per capita casualties in Russian regions (identified)

Region size is its population. Region colour is deaths per 100 000 population in it. Includes identified (not total**) deaths of 15 004 Russian citizens*** counted by BBC & Mediazona as of 24 Feb 2023.




...överväga dess folkopinion, när det gäller

Ta
rö
po

"Västs" stöd till UA


US gives large military aid, EU focus on financial aid

Bilateral commitments Jan. 24, 2022 to Jan. 15, 2023. Top 15 of 41 donors



Includes bilateral commitments to Ukraine. Does not include private donations, Ukraine, and aid by international organisations. and transparency please see our data


Figure 5. Bilateral commitments in percent of donor country GDP bilateral commitments January 24, 2022, to January 15, 2023



to Ukraine. Does not include private donations, Ukraine, and aid by international organisations. and transparency please see our data


Europe's response to major crises

Commitments in billion Euro




The EU mobilized much less resources for Ukraine

Figure 18. Weapon support in-kind military aid



Note: This figure compares the number of weapons sent by foreign powers during WW2 and during the Spanish Civil War (green bars) to the number of weapons committed to Ukraine thus far (blue bars). Historical data on weapon support for the US Lend-Lease program of WW2 comes from the US Department of State (1945) and US Department of War (1946). [Weapon support to Ukraine is from our database.]

total expenses in percent of donor GDP



Germany committed 3x more to liberate Kuwait

Strategi?

- För UA: "UA måste vinna och det är UA (Pres) som definierar det".
- "Västs kollektiva strategi" drivs f.n. av rädsla snarare än av vilja. Denna rädsla kan kategoriseras i fyra dimensioner:
 - Eskalering – vi fruktar RU kärnvapen,
 - Spridning – vi fruktar att UA ska gå för långt och/el att "Väststater" ska dras in,
 - Splittring – vi fruktar att (Väst ska splittras, men också att) RU ska splittras,
 - (Strategiskt) förlorande UA – vi fruktar att UA inte ska hålla ut.

Det har hittills inneburit "inkrementalism" och säkerställd eskalering.

(Efters-) om det rimligtvis är RU som, "efter kriget", *dels* ska betala de (i nuläget) beräknade 1000 md USD som återuppbyggnad av UA kostar och *dels* ska utlämna de tusentals RU medborgare som ska lagföras, om inte hela den internationella rätten ska äventyras – så säger det en del om vilket slags krigsslut det *måste* handla om...

- För SE?: "UA måste vinna - som 'UA',
RU måste förlora tydligt - och helst förnedrande, i UA,
Detta måste ske så snart som möjligt".

